the marginalia which Russell presumably made on his first reading of the works. Copies of all of the works cited, except for the article by Benno Kerry, are to be found in Russell's library in the Archives. The Frege works, with the exception of Grundgesetze, Volume , bound with the later Volume , are together in a volume labelled "Pamphlets" on the spine. The marginalia strongly suggest these were the copies of Frege's publications from which Russell worked when composing the notes.
   
The notes are extensive and primarily expository, copying Frege's own language, indeed sometimes preserving German terms such as "Bedeutung" for which Russell has no ready English equivalent. Russell saved his criticisms of Frege for the appendix. The simple extent of the notes, and their accuracy, by themselves should remove the suspicion that Russell had not studied Frege's work very carefully.
Every one of the over  references to Frege in appendix  can be found in the notes, but the cited passages are just a small part of the total notes and do not cover the whole range of Frege's works that Russell lists as sources. (The passages cited in the appendix are indicated in the transcription.) Discussions that compare the views of Frege and Russell on logic can now be read with a better appreciation of the nature of Russell's grasp of Frege's views.  Russell's interests are primarily in logical issues such as Frege's notions of extension, (or Werthverlauf ), concept, and assertion. There is no mention of the contradiction in the notes, although Russell does discuss it in the appendix. Indeed in the marginalia, and then in the first notes (at xxxiii below, Gg, p.   ) Russell seems concerned about the truth of Principle  when the functions involved are not concepts. Principle  identifies the "course of values" (Werthverläufe ) of functions which always have the same value for each argument. Russell seems to read it as applying only to concepts, which for Frege are functions having truth-
  
values as their values. In the final notes these worries are gone. The notes on Grundgesetze (at ix-xi ) follow Frege's discussion of these issues without remarking on the contradiction. Russell is more interested in Frege's distinction between a singleton class and its sole member (x and x in Peano's notation). Indeed, it is arguments from Frege (at ix, KB, p. , for example) which seem to have persuaded Russell to change his mind on this issue. In the body of the Principles Russell considers the "extensional" view of classes to be committed to identifying a class with its members, and so not distinguishing a singleton from its sole member. In Appendix  (PoM, p. ), Russell acknowledges Frege's arguments that this distinction must be made, even when one views classes extensionally.
Russell notes many passages in Frege's works that have since figured importantly in Frege scholarship. Thus he notices Frege's argument in Grundlagen that the implicit definition of "u has the number n" in terms of one-to-one correspondences does not yet settle what numbers are, in particular whether Julius Caesar is a number (at xvi, Gl, p. ). This leads Frege to the explicit definition of numbers as extensions. Russell does not notice what has since come to be called the "Julius Caesar problem", namely that identification of the extensions of coextensive concepts in Principle  still does not settle whether Caesar is an extension or not. Solutions to contemporary problems of Frege scholarship will not be found in these notes. Rather, they will be best used as evidence of Russell's grasp of Frege's views in .
Indeed, the notes only provide evidence of Russell's interest in Frege in the period preceding the completion of the appendix in November . Thus while Russell makes extensive notes on Frege's notions of Sinn and Bedeutung (at ii-iv and xiii-xiv), he does not notice the issues about the shift of bedeutung of expressions in "indirect" contexts and whether objects are constituents of thoughts, which became of interest in his correspondence with Frege in , and to philosophers of language since.  Other issues looming large in contemporary discussions of Frege do not appear at all in the notes. In the "Introduction" to Grundlagen  Gottlob Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence , ed. G. Gabriel et al. and Brian McGuinness (Chicago: U. of Chicago P., ), pp. -. Frege raises these issues in letters beginning  October .
(p. x), Frege cites three "fundamental principles" which he will follow: "always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective; never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition; never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object." Russell only mentions the last of these in his notes on that page (at xv, Gl, p. x) but pays a good deal of attention to the distinction of concept and object in Frege's thought. This includes his reading of Kerry's criticisms of Frege. Kerry argued that Frege must hold that concepts cannot be named by singular terms, hence that Frege was committed to the notorious paradoxical view that "The concept horse" is not a concept (at viii, BuG, p. ). Yet Russell appreciates Frege's view, though he thinks that everything, including concepts, must be possible subjects of propositions, or terms in his own system. Frege's principle "never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation" is not mentioned in the notes.
Russell's primary interest as exhibited in the notes is in those aspects of Frege's logical views that have to do with the foundations of mathematics. The earlier notes (at xxxii, Bs, p. ) cite Frege's definition of the ancestral of a relation, and Russell remarks, "Frege says this defines 'x precedes y in series generated by R '. [The whole proposition amounts merely to aRb]".  He seems to suppose that R is a transitive relation, in which case it is identical with its ancestral. However, by the time of writing the final notes (at xxii, Bs, p. ), his view has changed. Here we find: "This relation may be expressed 'x precedes y in the Rseries.' [It seems to be a non-numerical definition of R N , and very ingenious: it is better than Peano's mathematical induction.]" The passage from the earlier to the later notes thus records the moment when Russell came to appreciate Frege's definition of the ancestral of a relation. This remark suggests, however, that at this point Russell simply sees Frege's approach as a (superior) alternative to adopting an axiom of induction as  Frege defines the ancestral of a relation R as holding between an individual x and any individual y which has all the properties possessed by x which are hereditary on the R relation. A property F is inherited by the R relation if when some individual x has F then anything bearing R to x also possesses F . The natural numbers are defined as those objects bearing the ancestral of the successor relation to , and so it is easy to prove that the principle of induction holds for the natural numbers: any property possessed by  and hereditary with respect to the successor relation will be possessed by all numbers.
Peano proposed. Russell does not seem to see deriving the induction principle from logic alone as a primary goal for the logicist programme. It is simply "better", albeit "very ingenious".
One might think that Russell could have gotten the idea of the ancestral of a relation and its connection with mathematical induction from reading Dedekind's Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen?  Dedekind's work followed Frege's Grundlagen and Begriffsschrift, but Russell does seem to have been studying them all together to supplement and annotate his work in the Principles, so the remarks on Frege do not prove that Frege was his only source. However, the Russell Archives possess Russell's copy of Dedekind, dated March , but probably read carefully also only in . Russell made numerous marginal notes in his symbolism, and seven leaves of notes on the proofs.  In section  Dedekind proves a "Theorem of complete induction", to the effect that: "In order to show that the chain A  is part of any system ⌺ … it is sufficient to show that A ⑀ ⌺, and … that the transform of every common element of A  and ⌺ is likewise an element of ⌺." In section  Dedekind says that "The preceding theorem, as will be shown later, forms the basis for the form of demonstration known as complete induction (the inference from n to n + ).…" To this Russell remarks in the margin: "? Does not the definition of a chain involve mathematical induction in many cases?" Russell does not see in Dedekind the reduction of induction to logical principles that he identifies in Frege's work.  Although almost all of the appendix is devoted to foundational and philosophical questions, almost half of the notes cover the technical details of Grundgesetze and Begriffsschrift, and so by their sheer number show that Russell also studied Frege's logical works with care. Indeed the amount of this material alone shows that Russell was a careful and systematic student of all of Frege's works. Some of the objections to Frege's  Richard Dedekind, Was sind und was sollen die Zahlen? (Braunschweig: Biewig und Sohn, ; nd ed., ). Translated by W. W. Beman as "The Nature and Meaning of Numbers" in Essays on the Theory of Numbers (LaSalle: Open Court, ; reprinted New York: Dover Publications, ).
 In file  .. The pamphlet is found in a volume, "Pamphlets on Quantity" (Russell's Library, no. ).
 I am grateful to Leonard Linsky for suggesting to me the importance of the issue of where Russell learned about induction, and for passing along the view that he should have learned about induction from Dedekind. views in the appendix may seem confused, but they are based on a thorough grasp of much of his thought.
   
The  leaves of notes have been numbered (i ) to (xxxiv) in the transcription.
The first leaf in the transcription appears fourth in the file  . -. Leaves (ii ) to (xvi ) are in file  .-, followed there by the notes published in Collected Papers  as "Frege on the Contradiction". Except for switching (xiii ) and (xix), the transcription follows the order of the file. Leaves (xvii ) to (xxx) are in  .-, where they are found in the following order : xx-xxii, i, xix, xvii-xviii, xxiii-xxix. The two sheets containing leaves (xxxi ) to (xxxiv) are in  ., and were found among somewhat earlier notes in the Russell Archives. Leaves (i ) to (xxx) are written on a single side. Leaves (xxxi) to (xxxiv) are written on both sides (thus xxxi and xxxii, xxxiii and xxxiv are on two sheets), each side divided in half, right and left, each half written on from top to bottom. These sides are indicated by "rhs" and "lhs"; e.g., "xxxii, rhs" is the right-hand side of the verso of its sheet.
The transcription of the notes below is preceded by a list of "Russell's Sources", with abbreviations, based on Russell's own "List of Abbreviations" at page  of the Principles. The original German source that Russell cites is followed by a standard English translation. (The article by Kerry has been added. It is the only work not by Frege that is considered in the notes.) Russell begins each group of notes with the abbreviation for the work cited and then gives the page number for each specific note. The list of Sources gives a standard English translation for each and they provide the original German pagination, so that the reader does not need the German text to follow the notes. The exception is the Kerry article, which is, however, cited by Frege in BuG.
The transcription follows generally the indentation and other arrangements of notes on the page. Russell's own foliation is indicated in the upper right-hand corner, where it is indicated in the original. Sometimes leaves were renumbered by him, and this is recorded as it appears, with the new number to the left of the old, e.g. " ". Leaf (iii ) on "Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung" is clearly taken from before leaf (xiii ), which continues with two final notes. Otherwise Russell seems to have moved entire leaves without breaking up notes from one source, to add to the final round of notes. Some notes on Kerry, perhaps a sheet, seem to be missing, as the notes begin far into the article (xix begins with p.  and the article is on pp. -). As well one citation in Appendix  refers to page ff. of Kerry. This is the only citation in the appendix not taken from the notes. The passages cited in the appendix are indicated at their first occurrence with a superscripted "".
Sometimes Russell records a new page of a source in the middle of a note, suggesting that he is recording the turning of a page while taking notes. This is indicated in the transcription. Deletions are reproduced with a line through them, and in each case they appear to be initial, inaccurate notes that were quickly corrected. German terms are italicized. Russell's underlining is replaced by italics, except for German terms where the underlining is retained in case emphasis was intended. Editorial comments are indicated with angle brackets, < … >, as Russell uses square brackets for his own comments. Rare editorial interpolations are recorded in footnotes.
Rather than recreating Frege's Begriffsschrift notation, formulas from Frege are written in a contemporary notation meant to suggest the original. Thus rather than the concavity to express universal quantifiers, ᭙ is used, and a gothic font indicates what Russell calls the "German" (Fraktur) letters that Frege used for bound variables. Negation is indicated by ¬ (with parentheses to indicate its scope) rather than Frege's negation stroke, and the complex arrangement of strokes indicating a conditional is replaced by → with complex consequents placed in brackets. Russell's own is also replaced by → in keeping with his own imminent change to the arrow. Special signs in Frege's theory of one-one relations and number are replaced by new symbols, meant to suggest the original. Thus a raised "-" indicates the converse of a relation in place of . Russell's own notes directly copy Frege's notation. These two examples from the notes give the translation used below, followed by a reconstruction of the Begriffsschrift original, which Russell faithfully reproduces, only using German script letters where Frege has a Fraktur font.   Thanks to Edward Zalta for assistance with the Begriffsschrift notation and to the From leaf (xxii):
An image of Russell's reproduction of Frege's notation will be found at leaf (xxviii). If Russell's German script were retained, the transcription would look thus: Editor for the "German script" and Russell's special symbol , which was originally printed as a dagger and eventually as an arrow. Plate  of Papers :  shows the "fancy U" letter, , on folio , Russell's note on p. . Gg. p.  "⌫ = ⌬" is to mean the true, when ⌫ is the same as ⌬; otherwise, the false. p.  I call a name whatever is to bedeuten something. Latin letters not names. p.  German and Greek letters also not names. 
' 

.     
is the true, when and only when the true falls under the concept (⑀): in all other cases it is false. Also ' ⑀ {⑀ = (¬᭙ᑾ ᑾ = ᑾ)} is the Werthverlauf of = (¬᭙ᑾ ᑾ = ᑾ), which is the true when the argument is false, and is the false in all other cases.
] It is tempting to regard every object as a Werthverlauf, i.e. as extension of a concept under which it alone falls. Such a concept, for ⌬, is ⌬ = . Let us attempt ' ⑀ (⌬ = ⑀) = ⌬. This will do as long as ⌬ is not given as a Werthverlauf ; but the way of being given is irrelevant logically. 
⑀
Such a function is ʵ (defined later); but this is defined by means of Werthverläufe.
The function \ is defined as follows:
[This leaves it quite undecided whether x = x or not.] [If the class defined does not consist of a simple term, a ʵ u is the class of propositions any one of which is obtained by putting a as argument in a propositional function whose range is u. I imagine Frege regards all these propositions as identical: in this case, a ʵ u is the proposition expressing the fact proposition that "a satisfies any propositional function whose range is u". This is exactly equivalent to a ⑀ u. It will be false when u is not a range, or when u is a range to which a does not belong. But it will always be a proposition, whatever a and u may be. But if u is not a range, the class before which \<" " deleted> is placed is null, and therefore a ʵ u is the null-class. Thus a ʵ u in this case is not a proposition at all.] When u is not a range, a ʵ u is the range ' 
[note] I believe we could substitute concept for its extension. Might be objected () that a number would then not be an object () that different concepts may have same extension. I think both could be answered. p.  Given a propositional content dealing with a and b, abstracting from these we have left a concept of relation. The referent and relatum are both subjects in xRy. p.  A Concept of relation, like simple concept, belongs to pure logic.
Self-contradictories are also concepts. F is a concept if "a falls under the concept F " is a proposition whatever object a may be. The existence of  follows from the fact that "not identical with Self " is a null-concept. p.  Existence of  follows from "identical with ". p.  These propositions don't depend upon the existence of thinking beings, for the truth of a proposition is not its being thought. He defines "F is inherited in f-series" but not "F is inherited" nor "f-series". p.  He defines "y follows x in f series" as "y has all the properties inherited in f-series" [Kerry omits: "and , a simple or composite sign occurs in one or more places, and we regard it as replaceable, in one or more of these places, by other than something else, but by the same everywhere, then we call the part of the expression which remains invariable in this process the a function, and the replaceable part we call its argument."
 is sum of  squares" and "every positive integer is ditto", but "every positive integer" is not a value of x in "x is sum of  squares". "Every positive integer" is a phrase whose meaning depends on context. 
Whenu ʲ u, I say the property u is inherited in the R-series. German, Latin and Greek letters are not names, because they bedeuten nothing. But "᭙ᑾ ᑾ = ᑾ" is a proper name for the true. "If from a proper name we exclude a proper name, which is part or the whole of the first, in some or all of the places where it occurs, but in such a way that these places remain recognizable as to be filled by one and the same arbitrary proper name (as argument-positions of the first kind), I call what we thereby obtain the name of a function of the first order with one argument. Such a name, together with a proper name which fills the argument-places, forms a proper name."
By suppressing a proper name in like manner in the name of a function of first order with one argument, we get name of a function of first order with two arguments. By suppressing a function in like manner, we get name of function of second order. p. 
The Urtheilstrich belongs neither to names nor to marks: it is sui generis. A definition. p.  asserts that the new sign is to have same Sinn (?) and Bedeutung as old ones. For definitions, principle is: Rightly formed names must always bedeuten something. 
, provided the range of g is ' ␣ ' ⑀ (⑀ + ␣), i.e. 
The first proposition proved by Frege (Sec , § ff ) is u sim v ʳ Nc'u = Nc'v. This seems only to require u sim v . ʳ . v sim u, i.e. P ⑀ → . ʳ . ⑀P→. But Frege takes  pages to prove it.
(xxix ) < .- fol.> a
